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The International Undertaking (IU) – a non-binding intergovernmental agreement to pro-
mote the conservation, exchange and utilization of plant genetic resources – was con-
ceived in controversy during meetings held by the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) between 1981 and 1983.  The acrimony and distrust that characterized those dis-
cussions, and indeed much of the history of germplasm development and exchange, con-
tinues to influence the negotiations to revise the IU to bring it in harmony with the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  The issues of scope, access and benefit-sharing
have been particularly divisive.  The critical issues are so inter-related that it is difficult for
parties to make progress on one when uncertainty exists on the resolution of the others.
Mistrust can be a serious stumbling block to reaching agreement.  With time running
short before the self-imposed deadline of completing the negotiating process in 2000, it is
important for the parties to explore ways to signal their willingness and ability to foster
trust.  This paper explores legal mechanisms that may help parties overcome the barriers
that cause them to act with suspicion.  Specifically the paper explores resolutions, memo-
randa of understanding, letters of intent, and traditional and emerging diplomatic mecha-
nisms.  An evaluation of these tools and experience shows that there can be value in: (1)
disaggregating specific elements of negotiation, (2) identifying common interests and prin-
ciples that will govern and/or have to be incorporated into the final agreement, and (3)
establishing a process whereby it is politically difficult to ignore the outcome and recom-
mendations.  The paper concludes by suggesting the negotiators may wish to consider
various alternatives for moving forward including:  (1) separating the benefit-sharing is-
sue and addressing it during the negotiating process through a unilateral letter of intent,
(2) signing a mutual letter of intent or memorandum of understanding outlining the inten-
tions of the parties or relevant groupings of parties on controversial issues, or (3) signing a
letter of intent or memorandum of understanding that separates controversial issues and
establishes a process by which they will be resolved.
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A.  Historical relevance:  underlying is-
sues in the revision of the International
Undertaking
The International Undertaking (IU) – a
non-binding intergovernmental agree-
ment to promote the conservation, ex-
change and utilization of plant genetic
resources – was conceived in controversy
during meetings held by the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) between
1981 and 1983.  During these meetings,
developed and developing country gov-
ernments debated the ownership and con-
trol of plant germplasm in a highly politi-
cized environment concerned with Plant
Breeders’ Rights, genebank safety, the
management of genetic resources flows by
the International Board for Plant Genetic
Resources (IBPGR, the forerunner to In-
ternational Plant Genetic Resources Insti-
tute, IPGRI), and national germplasm em-
bargoes.  The acrimony and distrust that
characterized those discussions, and in-
deed much of the history of germplasm
development and exchange, continues to
influence the negotiations to revise the IU
to bring it in harmony with the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (CBD).
The issues of scope, access and benefit-
sharing have been particularly divisive.
Benefit-sharing issues currently dominate
the negotiations.  Discussions regarding
mechanisms, formulas, including efforts
to proportion the contribution and ben-
efits from germplasm exchange and plant
breeding, have left all sides uncertain and
frustrated.  The critical issues are so in-
ter-related that it is difficult for parties to
make progress on one when uncertainty
exists on the resolution of the others.  This
is exacerbated by the inequities that char-
acterize the relations between the negoti-
ating parties and the lack of a firm foun-
dation for cooperation.
B.  A legal perspective
In many ways negotiation is a laboratory
for building relationships among parties.
An important part of these relationships
is a party’s understanding of the degree
of trust it can have in other parties or in
blocs of parties sharing similar interests.
Mistrust can be a serious stumbling block
to reaching agreement.  The history of
inequity in the sharing of benefits derived
from the exchange, use and development
of plant genetic resources of relevance for
food and agriculture (PGRFA) has slowed
progress in reaching agreement on a re-
vised IU.  The development of personal
relationships amongst the parties through
an informal contact group is an important
step in building trust.  With time running
short before the self-imposed deadline of
completing the negotiating process in
2000, it is important for the parties to ex-
plore ways to signal their willingness and
ability to foster trust.  This paper explores
legal mechanisms that may help parties
overcome the barriers that cause them to
act with suspicion.  These are mechanisms
that may be used prior to reaching for-
mal agreement precisely to enable parties
to proceed to concluding an agreement.
By dispelling mistrust, the goal of these
mechanisms is to enable parties to chose
the more optimal solution of an agreement
negotiated on the basis of mutual under-
standing and cooperation.  Ultimately,
these qualities must underpin a success-
fully functioning revised IU.
This paper first explores resolutions, a
traditional international legal mechanism
by which parties can express their inten-
tion short of a legally binding agreement.
Next, the paper examines potentially
analogous mechanisms from the commer-
cial law context.  One of these, the memo-
randum of understanding, has already
I.  Background
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been adapted by the Secretariat for the
CBD.  Another, the letter of intent, will
be analyzed for potential relevance to pro-
moting trust in the international multilat-
eral context.  The paper will then look at
traditional and emerging diplomatic
mechanisms to resolve disputes character-
ized by suspicion and mistrust for their
possible relevance to the negotiations to
revise the IU.  These mechanisms tend to
be process-oriented.  The paper concludes
with a section outlining the possible rel-
evance of the mechanisms discussed to
helping to build trust amongst the nego-
tiators revising the IU.
Resolutions are statements made by par-
ties to a negotiation or agreement.  While
technically not legally binding, resolutions
can carry considerable weight and in some
cases are treated in a very legalistic way.
Examples from the CBD and the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species (CITES) provide good illus-
trations of how resolutions can be used,
interpreted and relied upon.
When the parties negotiating the CBD
concluded the agreement they wanted to
ensure that momentum was not lost in the
period after its conclusion but prior to its
entry into force.  Consequently, they
passed several resolutions setting out ac-
tion that was to take place in the interim
period, including a request that issues of
relevance to PGRFA be addressed under
the auspices of the FAO Commission.  The
Commission referred to this language in
its decisions to move forward on the re-
vision of the IU.  The Conference of the
Parties to the CBD (COP) also has relied
on this language and Commission deci-
sions quoting it to support the division of
responsibilities as set out by the original
negotiators to the CBD.
The passage and use of resolutions by
the CITES COP has evolved into a quasi-
legal process.  Species listings are author-
ized in the treaty itself and are a legal re-
quirement albeit one in which a party can
take a reservation.  The listing criteria,
however, were passed by resolution and
are revised from time to time by the COP.
The COP, however, refer to these criteria,
citing and quoting them frequently in their
decisions and actions. The whole culture
surrounding the discussion and use of the
criteria is very legalistic.  In fact, the COP
cites, interprets and applies the criteria in
the resolution no differently than one
would expect of a resolution with the
force of law.
I I . International legal mechanisms:
Resolutions
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Memoranda of Understanding are non-
legally binding statements reflecting the
parties’ mutual understanding of their
relationship to one another with regard
to the subject matter of the memorandum.
The Secretariat for the CBD has signed
Memoranda of Understanding with nine
international organizations including the
Secretariats for CITES, the Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance (the
Ramsar Convention) and the Convention
on Migratory Species (CMS) outlining
how they will work together on issues of
mutual interest.1
The legal significance of Letters of In-
tent can vary widely.  A letter of intent
can be solely a statement of intention (of-
ten mutual) with the understanding that
unless a definitive agreement is executed
and delivered by the parties there is no
legally binding agreement. On the other
hand, a letter of intent can be a legally
binding instrument with the judicial sys-
tem able to step in and decide if an agree-
ment is not reached.  Most letters of in-
tent take a middle ground and are agree-
ments amongst the parties to proceed in
“good faith” to consummate a transaction
with the letter containing a number of key
points.  The determination of what con-
stitutes good faith may take place in the
shadow of the courts and what they may
be willing to fill in should a dispute arise.
Traditional contract jurisprudence found
“agreements to agree” too indefinite to
be enforced and hence were hesitant to
intervene when there was an alleged
breach of agreement to negotiate in good
faith.  More recently, however, judicial
attitudes have loosened and courts are
more likely to intervene to determine and
remedy the breach of a good faith provi-
sion in a letter of intent.
1 Communication from Dan Ogolla, Legal Advisor, Secretariat for the CBD, 8 March 2000.
I I I . Commercial law:  Memoranda of Understanding and
Letters of Intent
A letter of intent can be a general agree-
ment to negotiate in good faith but still
contain certain legally binding provisions
(e.g. “Notwithstanding the foregoing sec-
tions, section X, Y and Z shall constitute a
legally binding agreement.”).  These may
be, for example, exclusivity provisions
(e.g. a provision preventing a seller from
talking about a potential deal for a period
of time), confidentiality provisions, pro-
viding for a break-up fee if a party does
not proceed with the deal, or a sunset
clause.  Letters of intent are most com-
monly used in business transactions such
as venture capital investments in start-up
companies, proposed mergers and con-
struction deals.
The lack of enforcement mechanisms
can limit the usefulness of commercial law
analogies to the IU context.  Neverthe-
less, as has been seen with the use of reso-
lutions in the CITES context, non-legally
binding mechanisms can create a process
whereby it is difficult to opt out.  Like-
wise, the use of a letter of intent in the IU
context would have to rely on non-legal
deterrents (such as damage to reputation
and political costs in this and other are-
nas) for its effectiveness.
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Diplomatic means of resolving disputes
characterized by a history of mistrust
present useful lessons into how mistrust
can be overcome to get parties to move
(perhaps slowly) toward agreement.  The
peace process in Northern Ireland and the
handling of environmental degradation
and potential dispute over the resources
of the Aral Sea after the break-up of the
Soviet Union provide useful insight into
means by which parties can be brought to
and kept at the negotiating table.2
A.  Northern Ireland
The situation in Northern Ireland repre-
sents a protracted and often violent po-
litical dispute requiring resolution.  Nev-
ertheless, the IU and Northern Ireland
share certain key attributes including: (1)
the need to bring parties with high levels
of mistrust together to reach agreement,
(2) a growing understanding of the need
for and value of cooperation, (3) issues
involving domestic sovereignty, and (4)
the need to ensure that responsibility and
power are shared in new institutions or
mechanisms.
Over a period of 15 years, British and
Irish officials worked together to create a
series of joint agreements, declarations
and initiatives that set up the structure of
the negotiations and identified the fun-
damental principles upon which the con-
flict could be resolved.  Building on these
efforts, it was ultimately the intervention
of an international body led by former US
Senator George Mitchell that succeeded
in reaching agreement in April 1998.
Throughout this process, progress was
often followed by serious setbacks just as
is currently being seen with implementa-
tion of the agreement itself.  Neverthe-
less, certain key features reveal themselves
as having been important mechanisms in
reaching agreement.  These include the
willingness to include all relevant parties,
the ability to disaggregate controversial
issues, the creation of new institutions
with credibility, and the ability to iden-
tify and agree on the fundamental princi-
ples upon which the ultimate agreement
would be based.
In February 1995, the British and Irish
governments agreed upon A New Frame-
work for Agreement, more commonly
referred to as the Joint Framework Docu-
ment.  The Joint Framework Document
set out a shared understanding of the pa-
rameters of the possible outcome, impe-
tus and direction of the process.  It also
identified the fundamental principles that
had to be incorporated into the ultimate
resolution including self-determination,
democracy and non-violence.  The Joint
Framework Document, however, did not
establish a solid foundation on which all-
inclusive political talks could be based.
The political parties of Northern Ireland
had never experienced face-to-face nego-
tiations.  Furthermore, obstacles to nego-
tiations needed to be addressed before
the parties would even consider negoti-
ating.  The most pressing of these was the
decommissioning of the stockpiles of
weapons held by Northern Ireland’s
paramilitaries.
Moving forward required severing the
decommissioning issue from the pre-ne-
gotiating discussions on the basis, partici-
pation, structure and agenda of the nego-
tiating process.  The decommissioning of
weapons was separated from other mat-
IV.  Diplomatic mechanisms for dispute resolution
2 Melanie Greenberg, John Barton and Margaret McGuinness, eds. 2000. Words Over War:
Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict.  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. The
information in this section comes from the chapters by Kevin King and Erika Weinthal.
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ters by establishing an International Body
on Decommissioning to provide an inde-
pendent assessment of the issue.  The In-
ternational Body, headed by George
Mitchell, was structured as a traditional
consultative body without authority to
impose its views on the parties.  The In-
ternational Body had the authority to cre-
ate its own procedures but it was to meet
with relevant parties to elicit their views
on decommissioning.  The International
Body also recognized the need to insu-
late the negotiations from violence.  It
therefore recommended that all parties
affirm their commitment to six principles
of democracy and non-violence (subse-
quently known as “The Mitchell Princi-
ples”).
While the creation of the International
Body was followed by some of the most
serious set-backs in the 15-year period, it
was ultimately on its report that the new
Labour Government of Tony Blair and the
Irish Government based their joint paper
expressing their position on
decommissioning.  It was this paper that
led to substantive progress on the issue.
The Agreement ultimately reached in
April 1998 (often referred to as “The
Good Friday Agreement”) certainly does
not mark the end of the peace process.
Ultimately, if implementation of the
Agreement and the peace process are to
be successful the parties to the conflict will
need to develop working relationships
based on trust and mutual respect.
B.  The Aral Sea Basin
Under the Soviet Union the fate of the Aral
Sea Basin and its water was a matter of
domestic concern.  With the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the Aral Sea Basin was
suddenly controlled by five newly inde-
pendent states with varying claims on the
water.  The experience of these five states
yields valuable information for the par-
ties to the IU on mechanisms to build new
regimes for resources allocation.
Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the five ministers of water man-
agement signed an agreement of “Coop-
eration in the Management, Utilization
and Protection of Interstate Sources.”  The
Agreement commits the five states “to
refrain from any activities within their
respective territories which, entailing a
deviation from the agreed water shares
or bringing about water pollution, are
likely to affect the interests of, and cause
damage to the co-basin states” (Article 3).
The uncertainty of the transition period
and in particular the fear of what would
happen without a central authority in the
Soviet Union provided the impetus for
agreement.  But cooperation lasted be-
yond this initial period.  The states in-
volved did not have the legal or institu-
tional basis for international cooperation
and it was the intervention of the World
Bank and other intergovernmental organi-
zations, including UNEP, that provided
this foundation.
Because of the sweeping nature of the
changes taking place throughout the
former Soviet Union, the World Bank and
other international actors were able to
take on a large role and to ensure that the
management of the Aral Sea Basin did not
become a conflict over resource allocation.
The need for substantial financial assist-
ance enhanced the role of the World Bank
in continuing to encourage cooperation
among the five states.  The help of non-
governmental organizations, the World
Bank, UNEP and other international ac-
tors has kept the five states of the Aral
Sea Basin at the negotiating table regard-
ing the issue of resource allocation.
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The negotiators revising the IU are find-
ing agreement on access, on benefit-shar-
ing and on the connection between the
two, difficult to reach.  The goal is to find
an acceptable way out of the impasse by
creating a situation that promotes coop-
eration and alleviates mistrust.  Parties
may wish to consider:
1.  Disaggregating and addressing ben-
efit-sharing through a unilateral letter
of intent: Severing the most contentious
issue – in this case benefit-sharing – and
addressing it through a unilateral letter
of intent on behalf of developed countries
may alleviate mistrust by making clarify-
ing intentions in a legal format.  The let-
ter could outline as specifically as possi-
ble developed countries’ intentions with
regard to benefit-sharing and the princi-
ples that will guide their actions in this
regard.  In all other respects, the negoti-
ating process could continue as planned.
2.  Signing a mutual letter of intent or
memorandum of understanding outlin-
ing intentions of various parties or
blocs of parties on controversial issues:
The parties could enter into a mutual let-
ter of intent or memorandum of under-
standing outlining mutual interests, prin-
ciples that will guide the process and then
specifically address the general intentions
of developed and developing countries
with regard to those issues presenting the
most difficulty.  These may be scope, ac-
cess and benefit-sharing.
3.  Signing a letter of intent or memo-
randum of understanding that
disaggregates controversial issues
and establishes a process by which
they will be resolved:  The parties may
wish to separate benefit-sharing from the
overall negotiations and establish a proc-
ess by which its resolution is facilitated.
The letter or memorandum could spell out
the general principles and process by
which options for resolution could be de-
veloped and establish a small group to
carry out the process.  The cases of North-
ern Ireland and the Aral Sea Basin illus-
trate that while concepts of international
law such as sovereignty can be obstacles
to resolving controversy, emerging prin-
ciples of international law such as trans-
parency and democratic process can be
helpful.  The group created would not
have any authority to impose its views but
parties will need to buy into the process.
The credibility of the group and the proc-
ess by which it developed its proposals
would need to make it difficult to ignore
its recommendations.  It also needs to be
a process that is oriented toward agree-
ment and not the ventilation of extreme
positions.  Incentive to halt that kind of
behaviour would need to be built into the
process.  Finally, it will be important that
the group not draft a precise but politi-
cally irrelevant package of options.  The
range of issues from both sides would
need to be represented and, as was the
case with International Body on
Decommissioning, it would need to meet
with relevant parties to elicit their views.
To have the necessary expertise one
would expect the group to have the disci-
plines of economics, law, genetics and
agriculture represented.
V.  Possible ways forward
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The negotiation to revise the IU is a com-
plicated interaction among parties with
disparate interests and a history charac-
terized by mistrust.  Like the situations
in Northern Ireland and the Aral Sea Ba-
sin, the negotiation also involves multi-
ple inter-related issues which can make
agreement that much more difficult to
reach.  Regardless of the means parties
choose to move forward in the negotia-
tions, valuable lessons can be learned from
the commercial law, international law and
diplomatic contexts that may lend insight
into possible legal mechanisms available
to promote compromise among the par-
ties.  There may be value in:
• disaggregating specific elements of
negotiation
• identifying common interests and prin-
ciples that will govern and/or have
to be incorporated into the final agree-
ment
• establishing a process whereby it is
politically difficult to ignore the out-
come and recommendations
• the participation of international actors,
including intergovernmental organi-
zations, particularly when they are
able to exercise financial or other le-
verage.
In addition, it may be concluded that
there is a need to:
• rely on non-legal deterrents as “en-
forcement” mechanisms for the pre-
agreement agreement or process
• be wary of an agreement to agree that
requires so much additional bargain-
ing and controversial drafting so as
to defeat its purpose.
Recognizing global interdependence on
the exchange, use and development of
plant genetic resources for food security;
Stressing the shared interest in establish-
ing a multilateral system for this exchange;
Noting the equitable sharing of benefits
is integral to the successful functioning of
a multilateral system of exchange;
The Parties to this letter do hereby im-
pose the following conditions and obli-
gations upon themselves:
Options for provisions
• requirement to negotiate in good faith
• principles that will guide and/or be
incorporated into the ultimate agree-
ment (e.g. democratic processes,
transparency)
• obligations specific to benefit-sharing
• framework or process by which pro-
posals for addressing benefit-sharing
(and possibly other contentious issues)
can be prepared.
VI.  General conclusions Annex.  Draft letter of intent
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